This paper considers the choice between an aLL-or-nothing (AON) ruLe and a proportionate damages (PO) ruLe in civil Litigation. Under AON, a prevailing pLaintiff receives a judgment equaL to his entire damages. Under PO, damages are reduced to reflect uncertainty. For exampLe, if the trier of fact finds that there is a 75 percent chance that the defendant is LiabLe, the judgment wouLd equaL 75 percent of the pLaintiffs damages. Using a moraL hazard modeL that takes into account defendants' decisions to compLy with LegaL ruLes, evidentiary uncertainty, and settLement, we show that AON usually maximizes the rate of compLiance, aLthough it may resuLt in a higher LeveL of Litigation. This, in turn, provides an efficiency rationaLe for the ubiquity of AON in the LegaL system. Justice Brandeis is said to have remarked once that "To be effective in this world you have to decide which side is probably right; and once you decide, you must act as if it were one hundred percent right." (Coons 1980, p. 260) 1. By "relatively efficient" we mean that the rates of Type I and Type II errors are sufficiently low and the difference between the error rates is sufficiently small.
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the choice of the optimal decision rule to be used by courts in awarding damages in the presence of evidentiary uncertain ty. Under the traditional all-or-nothing (AON) rule, coupled with a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof, the defendant is re-SHMUEL LESHEM is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Southern California. GEOFFREY P. MILLER is Professor of Law at New York University. We would like to thank Scott Altman, Gillian Hadfield, Dan' Klerman, Alon Klement, and participants at the law and economics workshop at Bar-Ilan University School of Law, the law and economics workshop at the Hebrew lJniversity School of Law, the faculty workshop at the University of Southern California School of Law, and the annual conference of the European Asso ciation of Law and Econo;mics for helpful comments. quired to pay the plailltiff's entire damages if it is more likely than not that the defendant is liable. In contrast, under the proportionate-damages (PD) rule, the defendant is required to pay a portion of the plaintiff's damages equal to the probability that the defendant is liable. The court award is thus higher under an all-or-nothing rule than it would be under a proportional rule if the plaintiff's claim is supported by the prepon derance of the evidence. For example, if the likelihood that the defendant is liable is 75 percent, the court award would be equal to the plaintiff's entire damages under AON but only 75 percent of the plaintiff's damages under PD. In contrast, the court award is higher under a proportional rule than it would be under an all-or-nothing rule if the plaintiff's claim is not corroborated by the preponderance of the evidence. For example, if the likelihood that the defendant is liable is 25 percent, the court award would be equal to 25 percent of the plaintiff's damages under PD, but no damages \vould be ordered under AON.
Commentators have long argued that a proportionate-damages rule would improve the accuracy, fairness, and legitimacy of adjudication and also reduce litigation (Allen et al. 1964) . This raises the question of why the legal systerrl almost uniformly follows the harsh all-or-l10thing rule in civil litigation rather than the more finely tuned proportional rule. As emphasized by Levmore (1990, p. 691), this question is "central to the understanding ()f any civil law system." The dominance of AON in civil litigation is even more puzzling when one considers that private settlements and arbitration decisions often result in compromised out c0t:n-es, a fact that suggests that "the 'fair' decision promoted in private i~ ~ne unattainable by law" (Coons 1964, p. 751) . Despite the impor tance of the subject, only a few scholars have considered the choice between AON and PI). As pointed out by Abramowicz (2001, p. 233) , "Aside from one article thirty-five years ago and a burst of interest twenty years ago, scholars have paid almost no attention to the possi bility of replacing the preponderance-of-the-evidence [all-or-nothing] rule with an alternative that is not 'winner take-all.'" This paper provides insight into the prevalence of AON by consid ering the effects of different decision rules on the incentives to comply with the legal standard and on settlement negotiations. It differs from previous analyses that compared AON and PD in that it considers the interplay between different decision rules, the rate of conlpliance, and the level of litigation. The analysis here identifies factors that affect the choice between AON and PD and thereby provides an efficiency rationale for the ubiquity of AON in the legal system. Specifically, we show that when the parties are able to settle the case before trial, AON usually maximizes the rate of cOITlpliance with the legal standard, although it may result in more litigatiton. In addition, our results highlight the im portance of settlement neg.)tiations for the superiority of AON over PD in inducing compliance.
To examine the effect of different decision rules on the rate of com pliance and the level of litigation, we employ the following stylized framework. We consider a potential defendant who must decide whether to comply with a legal standard. We assume that compliance is costly and that a potential plaintiff is more likely to suffer damages if the defendant does not comply with the legal standard. If the plaintiff suf fered damages, a settlement negotiation takes place in which the plaintiff makes a take-it-or-Ieave-it settlement offer to the defendant. If the de fendant declines the offer, the case proceeds to trial. We assume that when adjudicating the plaintiff's damages claim, the court may make two types of errors: it may find for the plaintiff even if the defendant complied with the legal standard (Type I error), or it may find for the defendant even if the defenldant did not comply with the legal standard (Type II error). Given that the adjudication process is relatively efficient,l we show that the plaintiff's expected recovery at trial is higher under AON than under PD if the defendant did not comply with the legal standard but is lower under AON than under PD if the defendant com plied with the legal standard.
Consider first the effect of different decision rules on the defendant's incentive to comply with the legal standard when the plaintiff's litigation cost or the defendant's cost of compliance is sufficiently high. In such cases, only AON induces the defendant to comply with the legal stan dard. To see this, assume first that the plaintiff's litigation cost is suf ficiently high. Then, since the plaintiff's expected recovery at trial is higher under AON than tinder PD given that the defendant did not comply with the legal standard, only AON supports the plaintiff's threat to go to trial. This implies that the defendant always violates the legal standard under PD but comlplies (at least probabilistically) with the legal standard under AON. Ass'ume next that the defendant's cost of com pliance is sufficiently high. Then, since the difference between the de fendant's expected payment from compliance and from noncompliance is greater under AON than under PD, only AON provides the defendant with an incentive to c.:>mply with the legal standard, even if the plaintiff always makes a high settlement demand. This implies that the defendant always violates the legal standard under PD but complies (probabilist ically) with the legal standard under AON.
Next, consider the case in which the plaintiff's litigation cost and the defendant's cost of c()mpliance are such that under both AON and PD, the defendant will not find it optimal to always violate the legal standard. Then, if the plaintiff suffered damages, the plaintiff would make a take it-or-Ieave-it settlement offer that is either high (inducing only noncom pliant defendants to settle) or low (inducing all defendants to settle). The defendant's expected recovery is higher under an all-or-nothing rule if the defendant violated the legal standard but higher under a propor tional rule if the defendant complied with the legal standard. Accord ingly, a high settlement demand is higher and a low settlement demand is lower under AON than under PD, which in turn entails that the difference between a low settlement demand and a high settlement de mand is greater under AON. As a result, the plaintiff's opportunity cost from making a low settlement demand is higher under AON than under PD. The plaintiff thl.ls has a greater incentive to make a high settlement demand under AON than he would have under PD. The plaintiff's greater incentive to make a high settlement demand results, in turn, in a higher rate of cOlnpliance under AON than under PD. It should be stressed that this result depends on the presence of settlement; if the parties may not settle the case before trial, the advantage of AON over --PD in inducing COIIlpliance no longer holds.
Although the rate of compliance is usually higher under AON, the level of litigation mlay be lower under PD. The reason is twofold. First, given that the plailltiff suffered damages, the defendant is more likely t9 have complied \vith the legal standard under AON than under PD; as a result, the defendant is more likely to decline a high settlement offer under AON. Second, the plaintiff's equilibrium probability of making a high settlement demand may be higher under AON than under PD. 2 Therefore, given tllat the defendant complied with the legal standard, he is more likely to decline the plaintiff's settlement offer under AON than under PD.
Since social cost is likely to be dominated by the expected cost of the 2. The plaintiff's equilibrium probability of making a high settlement demand depends on the defendant's incentive to comply with the legal standard, as distinct from the de fendant's equilibrium probability of compliance. primary activity (rather than litigation cost), this analysis provides an efficiency rationale for the prevalence of AON in civil litigation. We also identify factors that affect the choice between AON and IJD by evalu ating the social cost under each rule. In particular, we show that the advantage of AON over PD in inducing compliance increases in the plaintiff's litigation cost but decreases in the defendant's cost of com pliance.
The analysis here diff(~rs from previous works that compare AON to PD in three respects. First, our model emphasizes the interplay between the rate of deterrence an(! settlement negotiations. Specifically, we show that a greater incentive to make a high settlement ,'demand results in a higher rate of compliance. Second, the source of evidentiary uncertainty in our model is the imperfection of the evidentiary process rather than causal indeterminacy. TlLird, the cause for litigation here is the infor mation asymmetry regarding the defendant's choice of action rather than, as in some previous analyses, divergent expectations of the litigants as to the trial outcome.
Our analysis also sheds light on the choice between litigation and arbitration. Arbitration is often characterized by the flexibility of its procedures; this flexibility results in a considerable amount of discretion given to the arbitrator to resolve the disagreement. Accordingly, arbi trators are often perceived as deviating from a strict adherence to the parties' legal rights, applying instead a split-the-difference, or propor tional, approach. Another consequence of the flexibility of arbitration pro~.edures is that arbitration is usually more expeditious and less costly thaIllitigation. Given the advantages of arbitration over litigation, one might predict that private parties would have incentives to resolve their dispute through arbitration. However, recent empirical evidence has shown that sophisticated contractual parties seldom choose to include arbitration clauses in their agreements (Eisenberg and Miller 2006) . OUf results provide an explanation for the observed preference for litigation over arbitration: although litigation is more costly than arbitration and may result in a lower frequency of settlement, it is nevertheless more effective in inducing cOIILpliance.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Sectioll 2 reviews the relevant literature. Secti()n 3 sets up a model and compares the actual court award and the expected court award under AON and under PD. Section 4 presents the equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium out comes. Section 5 compares social welfare under AON and under PD. Section 6 briefly considers the case of nonsettlement. Section 7 concludes. 350 / THE J 0 URN A L 0 F LEG A L STU 0 I E5 / VOL U M E 3 8 (2) / J U N E 2 0 0 9 2. RELATED LITERATURE As stated above, only a few studies have considered the choice between AON and PD (for an exhaustive summary of the literature, see Abra mowicz 2001). Kaye (1982) shows that AON minimizes the expected cost of error as measured by the probability of a wrongful judgment multiplied by the amOllnt erroneously paid to (or withheld from) the plaintiff (for a similar argument, see Kaplan 1968 ). Kaye also showed that AON is superior to all other decision rules in minimizing the ex pected cost of error. Orloff and Stedinger (1983) refine Kaye's analysis by emphasizing that minimizing the costs of error need not be the sin gular objective of a decision rule. They show that PD may be superior to AON in minimizing the costs of large errors as well as in avoiding bias in the distribution of errors between plaintiffs and defendants. Nei ther of these studies COllsider the effect of different decision rules on the incentives to engage in the primary activity or on settlement negotiations. Shavell (1985) exanlines the deterrence effects of AON and PD by considering a potential injurer's decision to engage in a risky activity. Shavell's analysis concludes that under PD, but not under AON, the injurer fully internalizes the expected costs of ·harm in his decision whether to engage in or abstain from the activity. In Shavell's analysis, which is restricted to uncertainty relating to causal indeterminacy, a potential injurer faces a binary choice of whether or not to engage in the regulated activity: if the potential injurer does not engage in the activity he escapes liability, whereas if he engages in the activity his liability depends on the adjudication rule. Here, by contrast, we consider the rate of compliance among a population of injurers by allowing a potential injurer to raIldomize between complying and not complying with the legal standard. We thus reach an opposite conclusion from Shavell's.
Our paper is relatel:l to several papers that considered the optimal standard of proof (or evidence) in civil litigation given an all-or-nothing rule of recovery. Lan<:lo (2002) shows that a preponderance-of-the evidence standard (as <:listinct from, for example, clear and convincing evidence) maximizes deterrence and is efficient if sanctions are costless. Demougin and Fluet (2006) likewise show that a preponderance-of-the evidence standard maximizes the incentive to take care. Neither of these papers, however, consider the deterrence effects of a proportionate damages rule. In addition, in contrast to Lando's and Demougin and Fluet's models, in our lTIodel the advantage of AON over PD hinges on the presence of settlement. In particular, in the absence of settlement, no longer is AON always superior to PD in inducing compliance.
Our paper is also related to previous works that examined the effects of legal error on the rate of deterrence and the level of litigation. Polinsky and Shavell (1989) exalnine the effect of legal error on the decision to bring suit and the incentive to obey the law but do not consider the interrelation of these effects. Hylton (1990) considers the interrelation of legal error, the rate ()f compliance, and the probability of suit but is primarily concerned with the effect of legal error on the equilibrium rate of compliance. Gutierrez (2003) examines the equilibrium rates of per formance and litigation in a model closely related to ours. Her analysis, however, focuses on the~ effects of private contracting on social welfare rather than on the incelltive effects of decision rules.
MODEL
3.1. The Game 3.1.1. The Activity Stagf~. A risk-neutral party (the injurer) engages in a risky but socially valuable activity. The injurer must choose between taking care and not taking care. Let a E {L, H} denote the injurer's level of care. Assume that nett taking care (L) is costless but taking care (H) costs e. After the injurer has chosen whether to take care, an accident may occur. The accident causes harm to a risk-neutral party (the victim). Without loss of generality, we normalize the victim's harm from an accident to one. Let PL and PH denote the probability of accident as a function of the injurer's choice of care. Assume that PL > PH; that is, the probability that an accident occurs is higher when the injurer does not take care. We exclude fr()ffi consideration cases in which both the injurer and the victim may take actions to reduce the probability of accident. Finally, we assume that taking care is socially efficient; that is, (1) 3.1.2. The Settlement St'oge. If an accident occurs, a settlement stage takes place wherein the victim may present a settlement demand to the injurer. If the injurer accepts the settlement demand, the game ends. If the injurer rejects the settlement demand, the case goes to triaL To sim plify the presentation, \ve assume that the victim can commit to go to trial if the case fails to settle. As we later show, relaxing this assumption does not change our main results. 3 We further assume that if the injurer is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the settlement demand, he will rather settle than g~) to trial. If the case goes to trial, the victim has to incur a litigation cost of k. For simplicity, we assume that the injurer does not incur costs if the case reaches trial. This assumption also does not affect the substance of our results.
3.1.3. The Trial Stage. If the case reaches trial, the court observes a signal, 5 E {I, h}, indicating whether or not the injurer took care. Let qL denote the probability that the court observes a low signal given that the injurer did not take care (Pr (5 = lla = L) = qrJ and qH denote the probability that the COllrt observes a low signal given that the injurer took care (Pr (5 = lla = H) = qH). Assume that qL> .5 > qH; that is, the signal is informative, bllt imperfect. Thus, the probability of a Type I error (a false positive) is qH, and the probability of a Type II error (a false negative) is 1 -qL. Legal error may result from the insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial or the court's limited competence to cor rectly assess the evidence. 45 Table 1 sunlmarizes the probability that the court observes a low or a high signal conditional on the injurer's choice of care. Figure 1 shows a flow chart of the game.
In the model's evidentiary process, the court does not consider the injurer's prior probability of carelessness or the conditional probability of an accident in decidiJlg the injurer's liability. The court thus assumes that the prior probability of carelessness, given that an accident has occurred, is one-half. 6 We motivate this assumption on several grounds. As-Posner (1999) points out, incorporating the prior probability of care lessness or the conditional probability of an accident into the court's decision would reduce the value of the evidence presented at trial and would thereby compromise the injurer's ability to affect the trial outcome through his choice of action. In particular, a strong (weak) prior prob 3. See note 10. 4. For a similar technique to abstract the evidentiary process, see Polinsky and Shavell (1989) and Hylton (1990) .
S. Although we consider a negligence model, our model also captures a setting in which a contract between a principal and an agent specifies that the agent is to exert high effort in managing a project and the agent's choice of effort is unobservable to the principal but costly and imperfectly verifiable by a court.
6. Posner (1999 Posner ( , p. 1514 , for example, argues that rules of evidence allow nonbiased prior probabilities: "Ideally w·e want the trier of fact to work from prior odds of 1 to 1 that the plaintiff . . . has a meritorious case." In a similar vein, Lando (2002) distinguishes between the probability of guilt (or negligence), which takes into account ex ante infor mation, and the standard of evidence, which only considers ex post information. 
I h
ability that the injurer is liable would decrease (enhance) the value of exculpatory evidence. Similarly, a strong (weak) prior probability that the injurer is liable \\rould enhance (decrease) the value of inculpatory evidence. The parties: ' incentives to pro~ide evidence, as well as the in jurer's incentive to take care, would consequently be distorted.? In ad dition, the prior probability of carelessness may depend on factors such as the litigation cost, the cost of taking care, and the conditional prob ability of an accident. Information on such factors may not be verifiable. Moreover, even if information on such factors is verifiable, policy reasons may render such information irrelevant or inadmissible. For exanlple, character evidence, wllich may help to establish the prior probability of carelessness, is inadmissible (Fed. R. Evid. 404). We accordingly assume that the court's decisic)n depends solely on the signal produced at trial. 8
The Court's Decision Rule
We consider two decision rules by which the court may decide the dis pute. First, the court .1may use an all-or-nothing decision as to whether to grant the plaintiff's claim. Under this rule, the plaintiff recovers his entire damages if the court finds that the probability of carelessness is higher than one-half but obtains nothing if the court finds that the prob ability of carelessness is lower than one-half. We denote the players' payoffs under this rule by A (for "all or nothing"). Second, the court may use a proportionate-damages rule, whereby damages are split ac cording to the court's estimation of the likelihood that the injurer was 7. See Koehler (2002) for a summary of cOij.rts' decisions that conclude that information about a base rate-the relative frequency with which an event occurs or an attribute is present in some reference population-is irrelevant as evidence.
8. See Daughety and Reinganum (2000) for an exhaustive discussion of the justifica tions for a non-Bayesian model of courts' decision-making process. Reinganum and Daugh ety write (p. 372): "[W]e model the trial court's assessment of credible evidence in non Bayesian terms, not because we don't believe in Bayesian decision making,but because we believe that the evidence aggregation process is highly constrained. Whether one models this as 'mostly Bayesian with a few constraints' or 'mostly constrained with a few oppor tunities for Bayesian updating' is a judgment call." careless. We denote the l)layers' payoffs under this rule by 5 (for "split the difference"). 
Next, consider the court award under PD. Under PO, the court awards the victim a share of his damages equal to the likelihood that the injurer was careless. The court award under PD is thus and
--qL -qH
By Bayes's rule, d L is equ.al to the likelihood that the injurer was careless given that the court observes 1, and d H is equal to the likelihood that the injurer was careless given that the court observ~s h. It is straight All-0 R-NOT HI NG VERSUS PRO PO RTION AT E DAM AGE S / 355 forward to show that 1 > d L > .5 > d H > o. This, in turn, captures an in tuitive relation between AON and PD: the court award is higher under AON than under PD wIlen I is observed, while the reverse is true when h is observed. Note also that in the absence of legal error (that is, qL = 1 and qH = 0), the court award is identical under AON and PD.
The Ex Post
Expe~~ted Court Award. Let d~, a E {L, H}, and j E {A, S}, denote the expected court award under AON and PD as a function of the injurer's choice of care given that an accident has occurred (the ex post expected court award). As we will show below, the ex post expected court award given that the injurer took care and the ex post expected court award given that the injurer did not take care constitute the possible settlement ()utcomes of the game.
The ex post expected court award under AON is given by
The term qL is the ex post expected court award under AON given that the injurer did not take care. It is equal to the probability that the court observes (correctly) I given that the injurer did not take care, multiplied by the court award under AON when the court observes I (that is, 1). The term qH is the ex P()st expected court award given that the injurer took care. It is equal to the probability that the court observes (incor recDy) I given that the iIljurer took care, multiplied by the court award under AON when the court observes I (that is, 1). To facilitate the comparison between AC-N and PD, we denote qL as d~ and qH as d~.
It is straightforward to show that the ex post expected court award under AON is (i) higher itf the injurer did not take care than if the in.jurer took care (because qL> qH), (ii) lower than the actual court award under AON if the injurer did not take care (because qL < 1), and (iii) higher than the actual court a'ward under AON when the injurer took care (because qH> 0).
The ex post expected court award under PD is given by
The term dt is the ex post expected court award under PD given that the injurer did not take care. It is equal to the sum of (the probability that the court observes [correctly] I given that the injurer did not take care) x (the court a'lVard under PD when the court observes I [that is, dlJ) + (the probability that the court observes [incorrectly] h given that the injurer did not take care) x (the court award under PO when the court observes h [that is, d H ]). Likewise, d~ is the ex post expected court award given that the injurer took care. It is equal to the sum of (the probability that the court observes [incorrectly] I given tllat the injurer took care) x (the court award under PD when the court otbserves I [that is, dlJ) + (the probability that the court observes [correctly] h given that the injurer took care) x (the court award under PO when the court observes h [that is, d H ]). It is straight forward to show that the ex post expected court award under PD is (i) higher when the irljurer did not take care than when he did (because d~ > d~), (ii) lower th.an the actual court award under PD if the injurer did not take care (because di. < dlJ, and (iii) higher than the actual court award under PO wht~n the injurer took care (because d~ > d H ).
We make the following assumption about the ex post expected award under AON and under PD: 
Assumption 1 states that the ex post expected court award is higher under AON than un<ler PD if the injurer did not take care and is lower under AON than under PD if the injurer took care. As we show in Leshem and Miller (2008) , unlderlying assumption 1 is a notion about the efficacy of the evidentiary prc)cess. Specifically, assumption 1 holds if the rates of Type I and Type II errors are sufficiently low and the difference between the error rates is sufficiently small. This, in turn, implies that the legal system is relatively efficient and that the evidentiary signal is not strongly biased in one directic)n. In particular, assumption 1 always holds when Type I and Type II errors are equal (qL = 1 -qH).
The Ex Ante Expected Court
Award. Let Pad~, a E {L, H}, j E {A, S}, denote the expected court award under AON and under PD as a function of the injurer's choice of care prior to the occurrence of an accident (the ex ante expected court award). As we will later show, the difference between t]le ex ante expected court award when the injurer takes care and when he .does not take care affects the injurer's decision of whether or not to tak.e care.
The ex ante expected court award under AON and PD is given by
The term PLdt is the ex ante expected court award given that the injurer did not take care. It is equal to (the probability of accident given that the injurer doe~ not take care) x (the corresponding ex post expected court award under either AON or PD). Similarly, PHd~ is the ex ante expected damages given that the injurer took care. It is equal to (the probability of accident given that the injurer takes care) x (the corre sponding ex post expected court award under AON or PD). We denote the difference between the ex ante expected court award when the injurer takes care and when he does not take care by J1.A (under AON) and J1.s (under PD). More specifically, d A = PLdt -PHd~ and d S = PLdt -PHd~. It is straightforward to show that given dt -d~ > dt -d~ (by assumption 1), d A > d S • That is, the difference between the ex ante expected court award when the injurer does not take care and when he does is greater 'under AON than under PD.
THE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES
We-'solve the game bacl<ward. We begin by considering the victim's settlement strategy, 8; E [0, 1], for j E {A, S}. The victim's settlement strategy is the probability that the victim makes a high settlement de mand under AON or un.der PD when the victim has a credible threat to go to trial. We let 8; == w denote the case in which the victim lacks a credible threat to go to trial. We then consider the injurer's care strat egy, A; E [0, 1], for j E {A~, S}. The injurer's care strategy is the probability that the injurer takes care under AON or under PD. We then provide a general solution of the game. In Section 5 we compare the victim's and the injurer's equilibrium strategies under the different decision rules and consider the efficiency irrlplications of our analysis.
The Victim's Settlement Decision
If an accident occurs, the victim may make either a low settlement de mand (d~), which both types of injurers will accept, or a high settlement demand (d{J, which only the careless injurer will accept (recall the as sumption that the injurer will accept a settlement denland if he is in different between settling the case and going to trial).9 Note that the injurer will accept a settlement demand if and orily if the victim has a credible threat to go to trial, that is, if the victim's litigation cost is lower than his maximum expected payoff from going to trial. This maximum is obtained when the injurer is always careless, and it thus equals dt. We assume that if the victim is initially indifferent between taking the case to trial and droppillg the case, the victim would rather drop the case. Thus, the victim has a credible threat to go to trial if and only if his litigation cost is lower than dt (k < dt).
If the victim has a credible threat to go to trial, then his settlement decision depends on his belief about the injurer's choice of care. Let ~; denote the victinl's updated belief about the injurer's choice of care. Then, by Bayes's rule,
." AiPL J~i = .
(7)
AiPL + (1 -Ai)PH
Next we solve for the cutoff probability of carelessness under which the victim is indifferent between making a low settlement demand or a high settlement demand. The victim's expected payoff from making a low settlement demand, 'which both types of injurers will accept, is d~. The victim's expected payoff from making a high settlement demand, which only the careless-i.njurer will accept, is (8) The first term is the victim's expected payoff if the injurer did not take care and therefore accepts a high settlement dema11d. The second term is the victim's expected payoff if the injurer took care. 111 the latter case, the injurer rejects a high settlement demand and the case proceeds to trial, costing the victirn k in litigation cost. 9. The victim will never make a settlement demand (a) greater than dt, (b) lower than d{ and greater than d~, or (c) lower than d{I' A settlement demand greater than dt will be rejected by both types of injurers. It is therefore strictly dominated by d{ if the probability that the injurer was careless is positive and is dominated by d~'1 if the injurer is always careful. A settlement demand tbat is lower than d{ and higher than dt1 will be accepted by the careless injurer but not by the careful one. It is therefore strictly dominated by dt if the probability that the injurer is careless is positive and is dominated by d{1 if the injurer is always careful. Finally, a settlement demand lower than d{J will be accepted by both types of injurers, but so too is d{-I' A settlement demand lower than d~, is therefore strictly dominated by d~.
The victim is indifferent between making a low and a high settlement demand if (9) The left-hand side is the victim's expected payoff from a high settle ment demand. The right-hand side is the victim's expected payoff from a low settlement demand.
Plugging in the expression for ~i from (7) and rearranging yields
The interpretation of Xi is as follows. The victim is indifferent between making a low settlement demand and a high settlement demand if the injurer's probability of carelessness is X;-The victim strictly prefers to make a high settlement demand if the injurer's probability of carelessness is higher than Xi and strictly prefers to make a low settlement demand if the injurer's probability of carelessness is lower than X r Lemma 1.1 considers the victim's best response as a function of his litigation cost and the injurer's strategy. Proof.
See the Appendix.
Lemma 1.1(a) implies that when the victim's litigation cost is suffi ciently high, only AON supports the victim's threat to go to trial. In particular, when dt> k ?:.dt, the victim has a credible threat to go to trial under AON but not under PD. The rationale for this result is as follows. The victim's threat to go to trial depends on his maximum expected payoff from going to trial (dt). Siilce the victim's maximum expected recovery at trial is higher under AON than under PD (since, by assumption 1, qL = dt> dt), AON has an advantage over PD in inducing compliance.
Lemma 1.2 considers the injurer's probability of carelessness under which the victim is indifferent between making a low settlement demand and a high settlement demand under the different decision rules. Assume that k<d~ so that the victim has a credible threat to go to trial under both AON and PD. Then the probability of . carelessness under which the victim is indifferent between making a low settlement demand and a high settlement demand is higher under PO than under AON; that is, X s > X A •
Proof·
Recall that
The rationale for lemma 1.2 is as follows. The victim's settlement decision depends on the difference between his expected payoff from making a low settlement demand and a high settlement demand. Since a high settlement demand is higher under AON (since qL == dt > d~J and a low settlement demand is lower under AON (since qH == d~ < d~), the difference between a high demand and a low demand is greater under AON than under PD. As a result, the victim's incentive to make a high settlement demand is greater under AON than PO. Therefore, to make the victim indifferent between making a low demand and a high demand, the equilibrium probability of carelessness must he higher under PD than under AON. Thus, the victim's greater incentive to go to trial under AON induces a higher level of compliance under AON than under PD. 10
The Injurer's Choice of Care
We now consider the injurer's choice of care. We assume that k < diJ so that the victim has a credible threat to go to trial under both AON and PD. When the injurer chooses to take care, his expected payoff does not 10. The result that the equilibrium probability of carelessness is lower under AON than under PD holds even if the victim. cannot commit to go to trial. In such a case, the careless injurer must randomize between accepting and rejecting a high settlement demand so as to make the victim indifferent between taking the case to trial and dropping the case after a high settlement demand has been rejected. In any equilibrium, however, the victim always goes to trial. (To see this, note that if the victim drops the case with positive probability after a high settlement demand has been rejected, the careless injurer would always reject a high settlement demand; but this, in turn, would cause the victim to always take the case to trial.) The probability with which the careless injurer must reject a high settlement demand depends on the injurer's equilibrium probability of carelessness: the lower the equilibrium probability of carelessness, the higher must be the probability with which the injurer rejects a high settlement demand. The lowest (highest) equilibrium prob ability of carelessness is obtained when the careless injurer always rejects (accepts) a high settlement demand. However, the probability of carelessness is always lower under AON than under PD for any probability with which the careless inj urer rejects a high settlement demand.
depend on whether the case is settled or resolved at trial (since the injurer will always decline a high settlement demand). The injurer's expected payoff when he take care is thus (11) The first term is the injllrer's cost of taking care. The second term is the ex ante expected court award given that the injurer chooses to take care.
When the injurer does not take care, his expected payoff depends on the victim's settlement decision. The injurer's expected payoff when he does not take care is thus (12) The expression in (12) is equal to the probability of an accident given that the injurer does not take care multiplied by the sum of (the prob ability that the victim IIlakes a low settlement demand) x (the amount of a low settlement denland) + (the probability that the victim makes a high settlement demand) x (the amount of a high settlement demand).
The injurer's incentive to take care depends on the difference between his expected payoff when he takes care (see expression [11] ) and his expected payoff when he does not take care (see expression [12] ). The maximum difference is obtained when OJ = 1, and it equals I1 j == PLdl -PHd~. When the injurer's cost of taking care is sufficiently high, so that e> I1 j , the injurer never takes care. For such a cost, the injurer's expected payoff is higher if he does not take care than if he does even if the' victim always makes a high settlement demand.
The minimum difference between the injurer's expected payoff when he takes care (see expression [11] ) and his expected payoff when he does not take care (see expression [12] ) is obtained when OJ = 0, and it equals 117 == d~(PL -PH)· When the cost of taking care is sufficiently low, so that e < 117, the injurer always takes care. For such a cost, the injurer's expected payoff is higher if he takes care than if he does not even if the victim always makes a low settlement demand.
We 'next solve for the cutoff probability of a high settlement demand for which the injurer is indifferent between taking care and not taking The right-hand side is the injurer's expected payoff when he does not take care. The left-halld side is the injurer's expected payoff when he takes care.
Solving for OJ that satisfies the equality in expression (13), we get
,
The inj urer is indifferent between taking care and not taking care if the victim's probability of making a high settlement demand is OJ. The injurer strictly prefers to take care if the victim's probability of making a high settlement demand is higher than 8; and strictly prefers not to take care if the victim's probability of making a high settlement demand is lower than Or Lemma 2.1 considers the injurer's best response as a function of his cost of taking care and the victim's strategy.
Le m ma 2. 1.
Assume that k < dt so that the victim has a credible threat to go to trial under both AON and PD. Then we have the following: 
Proof.
Parts a-c imply that only AON induces the injurer to take care when the cost of taking care is sufficiently high, since the difference between the injurer's expected payoffs when he takes 'care and when he does not take care is higher under AON. In particular, when the injurer's cost of taking care is high (Ll A ~ e> as), the injurer will never take care under PD, but under AON his strategy depends on the victim's strategy.
Part e implies that when the injurer's cost of taking care is low (a:~ > e ~ a~), the injurer always takes care under PD, but under AON his strategy depends on the victim's strategy. The reason for this result is as follows. If an accident occurs, the injurer is expected to pay at least the amount of the low settlement demand (given that the victim has a credible threat to go to trial). Since a low settlement demand is higher under PO than under AON (because d~ > d~), the injurer's incentive to take care and to thereby reduce the probability of accident is greater under PO than it is under AON. When the cost of taking care is lower than a~ but hi!~her than a!, the injurer's benefit from the reduced prob ability of accident exceeds his cost of taking care under PD but not under AON.
Lemma 2.2 considers the probability that the victim makes a high settlement derrland for which the injurer is indifferent between taking care and not taking care under the different decision rule. The intuition behind lemma 2.2 is as follows. The injurer's decision whether to take care depends on the difference between his expected payoff when he takes care and when he does not take care. The injurer's expected damage payments are higher under PD than under AON when the probability with which the victim makes a high settlement demand is low. By contrast, the injurer's expected damage payments are higher under AON than under PO when the probability with which the victim makes a high settlement demand is high. When the injurer's cost of taking care is sufficiently high (e > e), it takes a higher probability of a high settlement demand to make the injurer indifferent between taking care and not taking care. Consequently, the probability of a high settlement demand that is required to keep the injurer indifferent between taking care and not taking care is lower under AON. In contrast, when the cost of taking care is sufficiently low (e < e), it takes a lower probability of a high settlement demand to make the injurer indifferent between taking care and not taking care. Consequently, the probability of a high settlement demand that is required to keep the injurer indifferent be tween taking care and not taking care is lower under PD.
Equilibrium Outcomes
Lemma 3 presents the Pareto-efficient subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the game. 
Proof·
The proof follows directly from lemmas 1 and 2. 11
Lemma 3 implies that there exist three types of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria:
Pure-Strategy Equilibria: (A;, 0;) = (1, w), (A;, OJ) = (1, 1), or (A;, 0;) = (0, 0). There are two types of pure-strategy equilibria. In the first type, the injurer never takes care and the victim either lacks a credible thr~at to go to trial or always makes a high settlement demand. In the second type, the injurer always takes care and the victim always makes a low settlement demand.
Hybrid Equilibria: (A;, OJ) = (X;, 1). In the hybrid equilibria, the in j urer mixes between ta1<jng care and not taking care, whereas the victim always makes a high settlement demand. 12
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria: (Ai' OJ) = (X;, 0; ). In the mixed-strategy equilibria, the injurer mixes between taking care and not taking care, whereas the victim mixes between making a low settlement demand and making a high settlemerlt demand. 11. Note that the injurer's strategy is discontinuous in the cost of taking care (at e = ti.7 and e = ti.;).
12. Note that when e = ti.;, any probability of carelessness A; E [>::;, 1] may be an equilibrium strategy, but A; = >::; is the Pareto-efficient equilibrium strategy. Similarly, when e = ti.7, any probability of carelessness A; E [0, >::;] may be an equilibrium strategy, but A; =°is the Pareto-efficient c~quili~rium strategy.
SOCIAL WELFARE
In this section we consider social welfare under AON and po. The expected social cost under AON and po is equal to
The first and seconcl terms are the expected cost of the primary activity: the first term is the expected cost of accidents plus the expected cost of taking care when the injurer does not take care; the second term "is the expected cost of accidents when the injurer takes care. The third term is the expected cost of litigation. Note that the case proceeds to trial if and only if the victim presents a high settlement demand to the careful InjUrer.
Proposition 1 The injurer is careless with certainty under PD but plays a mixed strategy AA = ~A or is careful with certainty under AON ....-when (i) the litigati()n cost is high and the cost of taking care is not very higl1 or (ii) the litigation cost is low and the cost of taking care is high. AON , is when the injurer's cost of taking care is high (part ii). The advantage of AON over PD in inducing carefulness stems from the fact that the maximum difference between the injurer's expected damage payments when he takes care and when he does not take care is greater under AON than under PD. Note that under AON the expected litigation cost is positive, because both the injurer and the victim play mixed strategies. Under PD, by contrast, the case never goes to trial because the injurer always accepts the victim's high settlement demand.
The injurer is careful with certainty under PD but plays a mixed strategy AA = X A under AON when the litigation cost is low and the cost of taking care is low. Proposition 1.2 presents the case in which the injurer always takes care under PD but randomizes between taking care and not taking care under AON. Accordingly, the expected cost of the primary activity is lower under PD than under AON. The advantage of PD over AON in inducing carefulness stems from the fact that the injurer's minimum e~pected damage pay_ments (obtained when the victim always makes a low settlement demalld) are higher under PD than under AON. Thus, when the cost of takiIlg care is low and the victim has a credible threat to go to trial, the injurer under PD always takes care even if the victim always makes a low settlement demand. In contrast, the injurer under AON would still find it optimal to randomize between taking care and not taking care, becallse the injurer's minimum expected damage pay ments under AON are lower than under PD. Note that the case never reaches trial under PI) since under PD the victim always makes a low settlement demand. Under AON, by contrast, the expected litigation cost is positive because both the injurer and the victim play mixed strategies. 3 presents the case in which the injurer and the victim randomize their actions under both AON and PD. As was shown in lemma 1.2, the equilibrilLm probability of carelessness is always lower under AON than under PD, because the victim has a stronger incentive to make a high settlement demand under AON. Consequently, the ex pected cost of the primary activity is lower under AON than under PD. In contrast, as was showll in lemma 2.2, the equilibrium probability of a high settlement demand may be either higher or lower under AON than under PD, depending on the injurer's cost of taking care. Conse quently, when the victim's probability of making a high settlement de mand is higher under AON, the expected litigation cost is higher under AON than under PD. This is because the injurer is more likely to be careful under AON than under PO and because the probability of liti gation increases in the equilibrium probability of carefulness. 13 In con trast, when the victim's probability of making a high settlement demand is 10'Y_e( under AON thaIl under PO, the expected litigation cost may be lower under AON even though the injurer is more likely to decline a high settlement demand under AON. Table 3 summarizes the results of propositions 1.1-1.3.
Proposition 2 compares the effect of an increase in the litigation cost and the cost of taking care on the expected cost of the primary activity and the expected litigationL cost under AON and under PD in the mixed strategy equilibria.
Proposition 2: Comparative Statics.
Consider equilibria in which the injurer and the victim play mixed strategies under both AON and PD: a) As the litigation cost increases, i) the expected cost of the primary activity increases more rapidly under PO than ul1der AON, and 13. Recall that the expected litigation cost is given by (1 -Aj)PHOjO ii) the expected litil~ation cost increases more rapidly under AON than under PD. b) As the cost of takin.g care increases, i) the expected cost of the primary activity increases more rapidly under AON thaIl under PD, and ii) the expected litigation cost increases more rapidly under PD than under AON.
Proof.
See the Appen.dix.
Consider first part a. As the litigation cost increases, the victim's relative incentive to make a high settlement demand under AON versus under PD increases. As a result, the equilibrium probability of careless ness'-jncreases more rapi<lly under PD relative to AON. This in turn implies that the advantage of AON over PD in inducing compliance increases in the victim's litigation cost.
The effect of an increase in the litigation cost on the expected liti gation cost under AON versus PD is twofold. On the one hand, as the litigation cost increases, the equilibrium probability of carelessness in creases more rapidly under PD relative to AON (as shown in part i). Consequently, the probability that the injurer accepts a high settlement demand increases more rapidly under PD than under AON. This effect causes the expected litigation cost to increase more rapidly under AON than under PD. On the other hand, because the equilibrium probability of carelessness is always lower under AON than under PD, an increase in the litigation cost results in a higher expected litigation cost under PD than under AON. This effect causes the expected litigation cost to increase more rapidly under PD than under AON. As shown in the Appendix, the former effect dominates the latter. Accordingly, the ex pected litigation cost increases more rapidly under AON than under PD as the victim's litigatiorl cost increases.
Consider next part b. The expected social benefit from taking care (excluding the expected litigation cost) is equal to PL -(PH + e). It is easy to see that as the cost ()f taking care increases, the social benefit from carefulness decreases. It follows that the advantage of AON over PD in inducing carefulness decreases as the cost of taking care increases. In contrast, as the cost of taking care increases, AON results in an increas ingly lower expected litigation cost. This is because as the cost of taking care increases, the plairltiff's equilibrium probability of making a high settlement demand increases more rapidly under PD than under AON. Accordingly, the expected litigation cost increases more rapidly under PO than under AON. The results of proposition 2 are summarized in Table 4 .
THE CASE OF NO SETTLEMENT
To highlight the importance of settlement for our results, we briefly consider the case in which the parties may not settle before trial. In the absence of settlement, tIle victim must choose whether or not to file suit if an accident occurred. If the victim files suit, the case goes to trial; otherwise, the case is dropped. Note that the advantage of AON over PD in inducing compliance remains the same if the victim's litigation cost' {s sufficiently high, since the victim will have a credible threat to file suit under AON but not under PD. In such a case, the injurer takes care (at least probabilistically) under AON but never takes care under PD. Similarly, if the injlLrer's cost of taking care is sufficiently high, the difference between the injurer's expected damage payments when he takes care and when he does not take care is lower than the cost of taking care under AON but not under PO, even if the victim always files suit. As a result, the injurer takes care (probabilistically) under AON but never takes care uncler PD. We will accordingly focus on the mixed strategy equilibria.
In the mixed-strategy equilibria, AON is no longer certain to induce a higher rate of carefulness than PD when the parties may not settle before trial. In particular, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium, the equi librium probability of carelessness is higher under PO whell the victim's litigation cost is sufficiently high but higher under AON when the liti gation cost is sufficieIltly low. To see this, observe that to make the victim indifferent between filing suit and not filing suit, the injurer's probability of carelessness must be such that (16) where ' X; is the victim's updated probability that the injurer was careless given that an accident occurred. The first term on the left-hand side is the victim's expected payoff from going to trial given that the injurer did not take care. The second term is the victim's expected payoff from going to trial given that the injurer took care. The last term is the victim's litigation cost. Plugging in A;PL + (1 -A;)PH for ' Xi (see expression [7] ) and solving for A; that satisfies (16), we get
Proposition 3: No SettLement. Assume that the parties may not settle the case before trial arld that df > k > d~. Then there exists a cutoff value
where dt > R. > d~, SUC]l that the equilibrium probability of carelessness is lower under AON if k:> R., higher under AON ifk < k, and identical under AON and under PD if k = k. In particular, when Type I and Type II errors are equal (qL = 1 -qH), then k = .5.
Proof·
See the Artpendix.
The intuition behirld proposition 3 is as follows. In the absence of settlement, the equilibrium probability of carelessness is such that the victim is indifferent between filing and not filing suit. In particular, the greater (lower) the victim's expected court award, the stronger (weaker) will be his incentive to bring suit. The equilibrium probability of care lessness thus depends ()n the victim's expected court award given his (updated) belief about the injurer's choice of care. When the injurer is more likely to have been careless, bringing suit under AON will yield a higher payoff for the victim than bringing suit under PD. In contrast, when the injurer is more likely to have been careful, PD will yield the victim a higher payoff from bringing suit. Whether AON or PD induces a higher rate of carefulness depends on the magnitude of the victim's litigation cost. For sufficiently high litigation cost (k > f), the equilibrium probability of carelessness is higher under PD. This is because in such a case the injurer's eqlLilibrium probability of carelessness is relatively high, and thus the victim's expected court award is higher under AON than under PD. For low litigation cost, by contrast, the equilibrium probability of carelessness is higher under AON. This is because in such a case the injurer's eqllilibrium probability of carelessness is relatively low, and thus the victirrl's expected court award is higher under PD than under AON. In contrast to the injurer's equilibrium probability of carelessness, the victim's equilibriulTL probability of making a high settlement demand is always higher under PD than under AON. To see this, note that the victim's equilibrium probability of making a high settlement demand must be such that the injurer is indifferent between taking and not taking car~re'Recall that the difference between the ex ante expected court award when the injurer does and does not take care is higher under AON than it is under PD. The injurer's incentive to take care is accordingly greater under AON than under PD. It therefore takes a greater threat of litigation to induce the injurer to take care under PD than it would under AON. 14 The expected litigatiofl cost, however, may be lligher under AON, be cause the equilibrium probability of carelessness may be lower under AON than under PD. Last, when the equilibrium probability of care lessness is higher under AON then under PD, the expected litigation cost is lower under AC)N. 14. To see this formally, note that the injurer is indifferent between taking care or not if Pi(PLd~ -PHd~)e = 0, w'here Pi is the victim's probability of filing suit. Solving for Pi' the value of Pi under which the injurer is indifferent between taking care and not taking care, gives P; = e/ll i , where ,~; == PLdL -PHd~. Since, by assumption 1, ll A > ll s , it follows that Ps > PA·
CONCLUSION
This paper compares the all-or-nothing standard and the proportionate damages standard by considering their incentive effects on the plaintiff's decision to settle the case ex post and on the defendant's decision to comply with the legal standard ex ante. We show that AON generally induces a higher ratc of compliance than does PD, although it may result in a higher level of litigation. The advantage of AON over PD in inducing compliance is threefold: (i) the plaintiff has a credible threat to go to trial under AON even when the cost of litigation is high, (ii) the defen dant has an incentive to comply with the legal standard under AON even when the cost of compliance is high, and (iii) when the cost of litigation and the CC)st of compliance are not high, the plaintiff has a greater incentive to go to trial under AON than under PO, thereby providing the defendant a greater incentive to comply with the legal standard under AON. If society is mainly concerned with minimizing the expected cost of the primary activity, then AON is (usually) superior to PD. This result thus provides an efficiency rationale for the prevalence of AON in civil litigation.
The paper's results also explain the divergence between settlement outcomes (split the difference) and trial outcomes (winner takes all) and thereby address the concern that the allocation of damages in settlement negotiations is not replicable in trial. In particular, the more polarized trial outcomes under AON than under PD entail more polarized settle ment options under AON than under PD. As a result, the plaintiff's tncentive to go to trial (that is, to present a high settlement demand) is greater under AON than under PD. This, in turn, maximizes the defen dant's incentive to comply with the legal standard. In contrast, if the parties cannot settle the case before trial, then the plaintiff's incentive to file suit may be either greater or lower under AON than under PD. Specifically, if the defendant is likely to be liable, then the plaintiff has a greater incentive to file suit under AON than under PD, but if the defendant is not likely to be liable, then the plaintiff has a greater in centive to file suit ullder PD than under AON. Accordingly, the defen dant's incentive to comply with the legal standard may be either stronger or weaker under AON than under PD. Whether AON or PD induces more compliance depends on the amount of the plaintiff's litigation cost.
The paper also sh()ws that the advantage of AON over PD in inducing compliance (in the ITlixed-strategy equilibria) varies with the plaintiff's litigation cost and tIle defendant's cost of compliance. An increase in the plaintiff's litigation cost increases the advantage of AON over PD in inducing compliance, whereas an increase in the cost of compliance decreases this advantage.
Future research may extend the analysis of this paper in two ways. First, in contrast to the analysis here, one may let the probability of accident be dependent on actions taken by both parties. An all-or nothing rule may no lc.nger be superior to a proportionate rule, thereby providing a rationale for a comparative negligence regime. Second, one may relax the assumption that expenditures on compliance and litigation are fixed and exogenolLsly determined. An alternative assumption is that the costs of compliance as well as the costs of litigation are determined endogenously by the parties. Different decision rules would likely differ in their effect on the parties' choice of the level of compliance and legal expenditure.
APPENDIX: PROOFS Lemma 1.1. a) If k ~ dt, the victirn lacks a credible threat to go to trial.
Proof.
The victim's Jnaximum expected payoff from going to trial (obtained when the injurer never takes care) is dl -k. We assume that the victim drops the case' if he is indifferent between taking the case to trial and dropping the case. 
Recall from expression (13) that the injurer is indifferent between taking care and not taking care if -(1 -(Jj)PLd~ -O;PLdt = -e -PHd~. When e = d j , this equation holds for OJ = 1. Thus, if the victim always makes a high settlement demand, the injurer is indifferent between taking care and not taking care. For OJ < 1, the right-hand side is lower than the left-hand side; the injurer therefore never takes care. But then the victim must always make a high settlement demand, which will induce the injurer to always take care. This in turn rules out an equilibrium where OJ < 1. For 0; < (»~' the right--hand side is greater (lower) than the left-hand side; accord ingly, the injurer never (always) takes care. But then the victim must always make a high (low) settlement demand. This in turn rules out an equilibrium where 0; *-~. d) If e = d7, the injurer plays a mixed strategy, A j E [0, 1], if the injurer makes a low settlement demand with certainty. The injurer takes care with certainty if the victim makes a high settlement demand with positive probability.
When e = d~, the equation -(1 -(Jj)PLdk -(JjPLd{. = -e -PHdk _~' holds for 0; = 0. Thus, if the victim always makes a low settlement demand, the injurer is indifferent between taking care and not taking care. For 0; > 0, the left hand side is lower than the right-hand side; accordingly, the injurer always takes care. But then the victim must always make a low settlement demand. This in turn rules out an equilibrium where 0; > o. e) If e < d7, the injurer takes care with certainty. where 0; = dL -d~.
Since, by assumption 1, b A > os, it follows that dOA/de < dOs/de for ~~ < e < ~s.
Therefore, 0A(e) and 0s(e) are single crossing: there is a unique e E (~~, ~s) such that 6 A == Os.
To find the value of e for which 0A = Os, we solve for e that satisfies
Simplifying and rearranging terms, we get Q.E.D.
Propositions 1.1-1.3. Propositions 1.1-1.3 follow directly from lemma 1.3. Let x = (AA' 0A) and y == (As, Os) be the victim's and the injurer's equilibrium strategies under AON and under PD, respectively. The following strategy profiles constitute the Pareto-efficient subgame-perfect Nash equilibria under the different decision rules, the litigation cost, and the cost of taking care. Pro po si ti 0 n 2 (a) (i) . Consider equilibria in which the injurer and the victim play mixed strategies under both AON and PD. Then, as the litigation cost in creases, the expected cost of the primary activity increases more rapidly under PD than under AON.
Proof. The expected cost of the primary activity in the mixed-strategy equi libria is given by CPj = XjPL + (1 -};,)(PH + e), for j E {A, S}. Differentiating <P; with respect to k gives dlP; d):..;
(A6) dk = dk (PL -PHe).
Since ,PL -PH -e> 0 (see expression [1]), we will proceed by showing that d);.sldk > d};.Aldk .
Recall from expression (10) that the mixed-strategy equilibrium probability of carelessness is given by We proceed by showing that d):..sldk > d'AAldk . Observe that OA/(OA)2 < oS/(OS)2 (since 110 A < 110 S ). Multiplying both sides by IIPL' we get oAlpdo A )2 < OSIPL(OS)2.
Since 2PLP Q.E.D.
Proposition 2(o)(ii). Consider equilibria in which the injurer and the victim play mixed strategies under both AON and PD. Then, as the litigation cost increases, the expected litigation cost increases more rapidly under AON than under PD.
Proof. The expected litigation cost in the mixed-strategy equilibria is given Pro po s i ti 0 n 2 ( b) (i) . Consider equilibria in which the injurer and, the victim play mixed strategies under both AON and PD. Then, as the cost of taking care increases, the expected cost of the primary activity increases more rapidly under AON than under PD.
Proof. The expected cost of the primary activity in the mixed-strategy equi libria is given by lp;(e) = >:";PL + (1 -X;HPH + e), for j E {A, S}.
Differentiating <Pi with respect to e gives (All) Since, by lemma 3, X s > >:"A' it follows that 1 -X A = dlpA/de> dlps/de = 1 -X s .
Q.E.D.
Pro po S i ti 0 n 2 (b) (i i) .
Consider equilibria in which the injurer and the victim play mixed strategies under both AON and PD. Then, as the litigation cost increases, the expected litigation cost increases more rapidly under PD than under AON.
Proof. The expected litigation cost in the mixed-strategy equilibria is given by K; = ~(e) x PH(l -A;) x k, for j E {A, S}. Differentiating K; with respect to e gives dK j dO.
-= :.:..:..J. X P (1 -A.) x k (A12) de de
H , ·
Recall from expression (14) that the equilibrium probability of a high settlement demand in the mixed-strategy equilibria is given by e -d~ (PL -PH) 0; = pddt -d~) .
..
We will thus proceed by showing that dOs/de> dOA/de. where oj = dt -d~. Since, by assumption 1, OA > os, it follows that d'X.Aldk> d'X.sldk.
Now,
Differentiating >:'j with respect to k (by the chain rule) gives
(A16)
Twice differentiating >:'j with respect to k, we get (AI?)
Recall that X A < X s for k = d~ and that X A > X s for k = d~. Since X A and X s are both increasing and convex in k, they are single crossing: there is a unique k E (d~, dr) such that X A = Xso To find the value of k for which X A = X s ' we solve for k that satisfies (A18)
Simplifying and rearranging we get
Consider the case in which qH = 1 -qL. The ex post expected court award under AON when qH = 1 -qL is qL == dt if a = L and (A19)
The ex post expected court award under PD when qH = 1 -qL is and (A20)
Plugging in qL, 1 -qI., q~ + (1 -qL)2, and 2(1 -qI.)qL for dt, d~, di, and d~, respectively, in
we get (after some algebra) k = 2:. Q.E.D.
